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Volume 9
Issue 3
Online publication date 2013-10-25
Title Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures
Author Marianne Ojo
This paper not only considers why many concentrated ownership structured systems and jurisdictions are considering a shift to the Anglo American style of corporate governance, but also explores why the traditional principal agency theory may no longer hold in many concentrated ownership structures.

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Keywords Principal agent theory, stakeholder theory, informational asymmetries, risk, corporate governance, UK, India, Germany, U.S, Japan
Pages 87-98
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