Business and Economic Horizons

  Previous Article | Back to Volume | Next Article
  Abstract | References | Citation | Download | Preview | Statistics
Volume 2
Issue 2
Online publication date 2010-07-16
Title Collusion and seasonality of market price - A case of fixed market shares
Author Sylwester Bejger
Abstract The paper develops a simple supergame model of collusion that focuses on the role of fixed (exogenous to game played) system of quantity market shares. Conclusions implied by the model could be used to motivate data - saving markers of collusion based on market price behavior. Following conclusions of the theoretical model we propose marker of collusion based on detecting changes in seasonal parameters of prices in periods of possible collusion. An empirical application of method has been done on well known data of Lysine cartel case.
Citation
References
Bejger, S., 2009. “Zawodność rynków - zmowa graczy. Metody detekcji w świetle polityki konkurencji,” Ekonomia i Prawo, pp. 247-16

Bejger, S., 2010. “Econometric tools for detection of collusion equilibrium in the industry,” Dynamic Econometric Models,Vol.X, pp.34-45

Bejger, S., Bruzda, J., 2010. “Detection of collusion in an industry with application of wavelet analysis - empirical research,”unpublished paper, Toruń 2010

Connor J., 2000. “Archer Daniels Midland: Price-fixer to the World,” Staff paper No. 00-11, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN

Connor J., 2001. “Our customers are our enemies”: the lysine cartel of 1992–1995, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.18, No1, pp.5–21

Connor, J., Helmers, G., 2006. “Statistics on modern private international cartels, 1990-2005,” Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, Working Paper #06-11

De Roos, N., 2004. “A model of collusion timing,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, pp.351-87

Ericson, R., Pakes, A., 1995. “Markov-perfect industry dynamics: A framework for empirical work,” Review of Economic Studies, 62(1), pp.53-82

Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., 1996. “Game theory,” The MIT Press, Cambridge Ma

Green E., Porter R., 1984. “Non - cooperative collusion under imperfect price information,” Econometrica 52, pp.87-100

Haltiwanger J., Harrington, J., 1991. “The impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior,” RAND Journal of Economics, 22 (1991), pp.89-106

Harrington, J., 2005. “Detecting cartels,” Economics Working Paper Archive, 526, John Hopkins University, Department of Economics

Knittel, Ch., Lepore, J., 2010. “Tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28, pp.131-44

Levenstein, M., Suslow, V., Oswald, L., 2004. “Contemporary international cartels and developing countries: Economic effects and implications for competition policy,” Antitrust Law Journal, 71, pp.801-52

Oxenstierna, G., 1999. “Testing for market power in the Swedish banking oligopoly,” Centre for Banking and Finance

Röller, L., Steen, F., 2005. “On the Workings of a cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian cement industry,” Working paper

Rotemberg, J., Saloner, G., 1986. “A supergame theoretic model of business cycles and price wars during booms,” American Economic Review, 76, pp.390-407
Keywords Collusion, repeated games, fixed market shares, seasonality of market price
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.15208/beh.2010.16
Pages 48-59
Download Full PDF Download
  Previous Article | Back to Volume | Next Article
Share
Search in articles
Statistics
Journal Published articles
BEH 558
Journal Hits
BEH 1132549
Journal Downloads
BEH 41256
Total users online -